Current edition: JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations, dated 19 December 2022 — this edition
renamed the publication from the earlier "Cyberspace Operations" title and reflects U.S. Cyber Command as a
functional combatant command. As with any joint doctrine, check jcs.mil for the current publication before
citing a specific paragraph.
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OVERVIEW
What this publication is for, who it binds, and how it defines the domain it governs.
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Scope & Purpose
Provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess cyberspace operations — guidance for combatant commanders and joint force commanders (JFCs), and doctrine for operations and training.
Prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
Doesn't restrict a JFC's authority to organize the force and execute the mission as they judge best for unity of effort
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Who It Applies To
The Joint Staff, combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.
If this publication conflicts with a Service publication, JP 3-12 takes precedence — unless the CJCS has issued more current, specific guidance
Commanders in multinational commands follow ratified multinational doctrine where it applies
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What "Cyberspace" Means
A global domain within the information environment — the interdependent networks of IT infrastructure and resident data: the internet, telecom networks, computer systems, and embedded processors/controllers.
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What "Cyberspace Operations" Means
The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.
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THE DOMAIN & TYPES OF CO
How the doctrine structures cyberspace itself, and the categories of action within it.
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Three Layers of Cyberspace
Physical network, logical network, and cyberpersona — the standard model used to plan and execute CO.
Cyberspace depends on the physical domains (air, land, maritime, space) — it uses links and nodes physically located there
CO performs logical functions to create effects first in cyberspace, then in the physical domains as needed
Cyberspace is wholly contained within the broader information environment, which is why cyberspace operations (CO) and information operations (IO) are so interdependent
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Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO)
Cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.
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Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO)
Passive and active defense operations to defend DOD or other friendly cyberspace — conducted both inside and outside the DODIN.
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DODIN Operations
Designing, building, configuring, securing, operating, maintaining, and sustaining DOD communications systems and networks across the entire DOD Information Network.
This term replaced the older "DGO" (DOD GIG Operations) terminology
The 2022 edition added "cyberspace system operation" as a DODIN-related action distinct from cyberspace security actions
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Newer Concepts (2022 Edition)
Several concepts were formally introduced or expanded in the current edition.
Expeditionary cyberspace operations — a newly defined term
Persistent engagement in cyberspace
Defending forward in cyberspace
Hunt forward operations
Mission-relevant terrain in cyberspace
Expanded discussion of the law of war as applied to cyberspace attack
Expanded discussion of synchronizing OCO and DCO, and internal vs. external CO missions
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FORCES & ORGANIZATIONS
Who actually does cyberspace operations, and how they're organized.
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U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
A functional combatant command as of this edition. Commands the preponderance of cyberspace forces not retained by the Services; manages day-to-day global CO and leads DODIN defense/protection.
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Cyber Mission Force (CMF)
An entity of USCYBERCOM, organized into four team types with distinct missions.
Team Type
Mission
Cyber National Mission Teams
Defend the nation — observe adversary activity, block attacks, maneuver in cyberspace to defeat them
Cyber Combat Mission Teams
Conduct military cyber operations in support of combatant commands
Cyber Protection Teams
Defend DOD information networks, protect priority missions, prepare cyber forces for combat
Cyber Support Teams
Analytic and planning support to National Mission and Combat Mission teams
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Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF)
Elevated to a sub-unified combatant command in December 2022 — a significant organizational change reflected in the current doctrine.
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JFHQ-DODIN
Joint Force Headquarters – DOD Information Networks, another component supporting the overall Cyber Mission Force structure.
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NSA Relationship
NSA works closely with USCYBERCOM through a dual-hatted Director. NSA's two primary missions are information assurance for national security systems, and signals intelligence.
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National Guard Coordination
USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM coordinates with the Chief, National Guard Bureau on cyberspace matters involving the Guard.
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CHALLENGES TO THE JOINT FORCE'S USE OF CYBERSPACE
The persistent, structural problems every JFC has to plan around in this domain.
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Connectivity & Access
Gaining access to operationally useful cyberspace — including targets within it — is limited by legal, policy, or operational constraints. Access is never guaranteed.
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Threats
Everything from nation-states to individual actors to accidents and natural hazards can threaten cyberspace operations.
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Anonymity & Attribution
Confidently identifying who did what in cyberspace is a persistent, structural difficulty — not a solvable one-time problem.
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Geography Challenges
Cyberspace doesn't respect the traditional geographic boundaries that shape operations in the physical domains.
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Technology Challenges
A cyberspace capability often depends on exploiting a specific technical vulnerability — which can close at any time.
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Private Industry & Public Infrastructure
Much of the terrain the joint force depends on and operates around is privately owned or publicly shared — DOD doesn't have direct authority over it.
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Globalization
DOD's global cyberspace footprint means friendly, adversary, allied, and neutral activity often shares the same terrain simultaneously.
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Mitigations
Since DOD has no direct authority to mitigate risk across all of cyberspace alone, it partners with the defense industrial base and other stakeholders to manage shared risk.